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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLIFFORD A. PRINCE, dba 
PRINCE CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
and WESTERN SURETY COMPANY, 




BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ARNOLD MACHINERY COMPANY , 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE -^ " 
This is an action to recover from a subcontractor 
and his surety for rental of equipment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The matter was entirely disposed of by summary judg-
CD 
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ments. The court granted plaintiff Arnold's motion 
for summary judgment awarding Arnold judgment in the 
amount of $11,415.74 against the subcontractor, Prince. 
The court denied Arnold!s motion for summary judgment 
against Prince's surety, Western Surety Company. The 
court granted the surety company's motion to dismiss 
the action against it on the grounds that the action 
was barred by the .one year statute of limitations in 
14-2-2 UCA, 1953. ' ' ~ m, 
^•m*: 
;fei., 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Arnold seeks judgment against Prince's surety 
company in the amount of $11,415.74, the amount award-
ed it against Prince, together with interest thereafter, 
by reversal of the summary judgment dismissing the surety 
company and reversal of the denial of Arnold's motion 
for summary judgment against the surety company. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS ' -
R. C. Tolman Construction Company was the prime 
contractor for construction of a roadway and lagoons 
for a sanitation system at Fish Lake, Utah for the 
United States Forest Service. Prince entered into a 
(2) 
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subcontract with Tolman to do excavation work. Prince 
rented a "Payscraper" from Arnold for that excavation 
work. Tolman, as prime contractor for a public work of 
the United States, was required by the Miller Act, 40 
USCA 2 70(a) to furnish a performance and payment bond 
to the United States, which Tolman furnished. However, 
that is not the bond involved in this action. 
•— Tolman, in turn, although not required to do so 
by any statute, required Prince to furnish a bond guar-
anteeing that Prince, as subcontractor, would "promptly 
pay all persons supplying labor or materials." Prince 
obtained the bond required by Tolman from defendant ^ 
Western Surety Company, Inc., and furnished it to Tol-
man. Arnold asserts rights under that bond as a third 
party beneficiary. , ,, 
Prince failed to pay the agreed rental to Arnold^ 
Arnold brought this action against Prince and his sure-
ty, Western. The bond contained no provision limiting 
the time for commencing action thereunder. The action 
was commenced slightly more than one year after the 
termination of the rental agreement. ' ;• 
Western's answer contained a general denial, an 
affirmative defense of the one year statute of limi-
tations contained in the Miller Act, 40 USCA, Section 
(3) 
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2 70(b), and a further affirmative defense that inas-
much as the contract involved a federal construction 
project, jurisdiction was vested by the Miller Act 
solely in the federal district court. 
Arnold moved for partial summary judgment on the 
grounds that, except for the amount of the obligation 
(which has since been adjudicated) there was no genu-
ine issue of fact and that the sole issues between 
Arnold and Western were issues of law, all of which 
should be resolved in Arnold's favor. Arnold con-
tended that (1) the state court had jurisdiction; 
(2) the Miller Act one year statute of limitations 
was inapplicable, and (3) Arnold was a third party 
beneficiary of the bond and was, therefore, a real 
party in interest; 
Western also moved for summary judgment seeking 
dismissal from the action, asserting that (1) the 
state court had no jurisdiction and (2) the Miller 
Act one year statute of limitation barred the action. 
In its memorandum in support of its motion, Western 
asserted not only the one year federal Miller Act 
limitation, but also one year limitations provided 
in two state statutes. ^ 
One state limitation asserted is that set forth 
(4) 
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in 14-1-6 UCA, which is a limitation relating to bond-
ing requirements for state, as distinguished from fed-
eral, construction projects (14-1-1.1 UCA). The act 
is sometimes referred to as the "Little-Miller Act." 
It requires a bond to be furnished to the State of 
Utah or to its political subdivisions for state or 
county construction projects. 
." The other state limitation asserted by Western 
is 14-2-2 UCA which is a limitation relating to pri-
vate contracts, whereby an owner of land who enters 
into a contract involving $500 or more for construc-
tion of improvements thereon is required to furnish 
a bond. (14-2-1 UCA) J 
Although not raised by Western, the court also 
considered the one year limitation period in 38-1-11 
UCA relating to mechanic's liens. (38-1-1 UCA) 
The court in its memorandum decision denying 
Arnold^ granting Western's motion, reasone 
a s f o l l O W S f :.'/...'"•'.'" ^'••••'' :-:'•••r •••.-'.- "•:•• 
"Under Section 270(b) of Title 40, USCA, 
it is apparent that parties furnishing mat-
erials on a job covered by the Miller Act, 
whether they be subcontractors or suppliers . ... 
to subcontractors, have a right of action on 
the bond required by that Act. If their 
rights under the act are asserted pursuant 
to that statute, then the action must be 
- < filed in the federal court within the time w 
(5) 
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required by that statute. However, the 
Miller Act does not make action under that 
statute the exclusive remedy to a material 
or labor claim for materials or services 
furnished on a federal project and if an 
unpaid materialman or laborer chooses not 
to sue under the act on the bond required 
by the United States on a federal project, 
he loses the benefit of the act and the pro-
tection of the bond required by the federal 
government but not his claim or remedy un-
less otherwise barred. Thus, the Miller 
Act is no bar to plaintiff!s complaint and 
its one year statute of limitations is not 
applicable: 
Plaintiff alleges that the state 
Mechanics Lien laws (sec. 38-1-1 et seq.) 
are not applicable because Section 1 thereof 
specifically provides that its provisions do 
not apply to any public building, structure 
or improvement and this case involves a pub-
lic improvement. Plaintiff further contends 
that Chapter 2 of Title 14 dealing with 
mechanic?s and materialmen's liens on pri-
vate contract does not apply because defendant 
Prince is not an owner but was a contractor; 
and that Chapter 1 of said Title relating to 
public contracts is not applicable because 
the project did not involve furnishing work 
for the state or any of its political sub-
divisions. Plaintiff thus contends that the 
six year statute of limitations relating to 
written contracts is controlling and that 
the action may be maintained, or that the 
four or three year statutes could apply in-
stead of the one year statute set forth in 
Section 14-2-2. 
It is my opinion that the fact that the 
bond required of Prince was by the general con-
tractor Tolman, rather than by the "owner" of 
the land does not take the contract outside of 
the scope of Chapter 2, Title 14, and that con-
tractors, sureties, materialmen and laborers 
all are bound to meet the requirements of 
Sec. 14-2-1 et seq. including that of commencing 
(6) 
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the action within one year from the date the 
last materials were furnished or the labor 
performed. 
This plaintiff has not done and its motion 
for partial summary judgment is denied except 
as otherwise indicated-with respect to the appli-
cability of the Miller Act, and defendant West1* 
ern!s motion for summary judgment of dismissal 
is granted.,T 
The court thereupon entered an order denying Arnold's 
motion for partial summary judgment and granting Western's 
motion for dismissal. Appeal is taken from both facets 
of that order. 
ARGUMENT 
• ~ -•• ' • • - * * 
Because of the possibility that the Supreme Court 
could affirm on the basis that the trial court was right 
for the wrong reason, we shall discuss the various 
issues presented, even though some were not relied upon 
by the court in making its ruling. 
The Court Correctly Ruled That The 
Miller Act Was Inapplicable 
The language of the Miller Act is controlling in 
determining that it does not apply. It provides that: 
11
 (a) Before any contract, exceeding 
$2,000 in amount for the construction, alter-
(7) 
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ation, or repair of any public building or 
public work of the United States is awarded 
to any person, such person shall furnish to 
the United States the following bonds, which 
shall become binding upon the award of the 
contract to such person, who is hereinafter 
designated as Tcontractory: 
(1) A performance bond with a 
surety or sureties satisfactory to the offi-
cer awarding such contract, and in such amount 
as he shall deem adequate, for the protection 
of the United States. •*".,,•'"*., 
.a. A payment bond with a surety 
or sureties satisfactory to such offi-
cer for the protection of all persons 
supplying labor and material in the 
prosecution of the work provided for 
in said contract for the use of each 
such persons..." 40 USC 270(a). 
"(b) Every suit instituted under this sec-
tion shall be brought in the name of the United 
States for the use of the person suing, in the 
United States District Court for any district in 
which the contract was to be performed and exe-
cuted and not elsewhere, irrespective of the a-
mount in controversy in such suit, but no such 
suit shall be commenced after the expiration of 
one year after the day on which the last of the 
labor was performed or material was supplied by 
him. The United States shall not be liable for 
the payment of any costs or expenses of any such 
suit.11 40 USC 270(b). 
That act requires the contractor to furnish the 
United States a bond. There is no provision for a sub-
contractor to furnish the contractor a bond. Arnold's 
action is on the bond furnished by the subcontractor to 
the contractor. Consequently, the court correctly con-
cluded that the Miller Act did not apply. It correctly 
(8) 
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ruled that the state court had jurisdiction because 
the exclusive federal court jurisdiction provided for 
therein was inapplicable. It also correctly ruled 
that the Miller Act one year limitation provision was 
inapplicable. * 
One Year State Statutes Of 
1
 Limitations Are Inapplicable 
"Little Miller Actn 
Western argued that there is a one year limitation 
provision in the "Little Miller Act," 14-1-6 UCA, where-
in contractors with the state or its political subdivi-
sions have a bond requirement. 
The "Little Miller Act" relates to persons... 
"bidding to do work...for the state, or for 
any political subdivision thereof." 14-1-1.1 
Since this was a federal project and not one for the 
state or any political subdivision thereof, the "Little 
Miller Act" and its one year limitation provisions are 
inapplicable. 
The court properly did not apply it. 
Mechanic's Lien Act 
The one year limitation provision in 38-1-11 UCA 
(9) 
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referred to in the court's memorandum decision is inapp-
licable; not only for the reason given by the court, that 
38-1-1 provides that the frchapter shall not apply to any 
public building, structure or improvements," but more 
obviously, because no lien is asserted by Arnold. 
The court properly did not apply it. 
Private Contracts Bonding Act 
After considering and properly concluding that the 
one year limitation in the Miller Act, "Little Miller 
Act" and Mechanic!s Lien Act were inapplicable because 
the bond sued on herein was not of the type involved in 
any of those acts, the court illogically applied another. 
The court concluded that the one year limitation in 
14-2-2 UCA bars Arnold's action. Chapter 14-2 pro-
vides that a landowner making improvements shall require 
the contractor to furnish a bond. The court ruled that 
the one year limitation therein was applicable to this 
situation, in which the contractor required the sub-
contractor to furnish a bond which ran to the contractor. 
The Private Contracts bonding act provides that... 
""the owner of any interests in land entering 
into a contract, involving $500 or more, for 
the construction...of any... improvement upon 
land...shall...obtain from the contractor a 
bond... Such bond shall run to the owner..." 
1TT-1 UCA (emphasis addeT) 
(10) 
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If that act be so construed that it is applied 
to contracts for improvements on public unpatented 
land owned by the United SCates, such construction 
would require the United States to obtain a bond 
from the contractor. The State of Utah could not 
impose such a>requirement upon the sovereign United 
States."' . Furthermore^- this action involves a bond 
which was not required by the owner of land from the 
contractor, but by the contractor from his subcon-
tractor. ;The bond ran to the contractor, oiot to the 
owner, 'r.-\ ^ - •'.--•—
 : :..,<*• 
Tt is therefore obvious that the Private Contracts 
bonding act relates to a different type of transaction, 
consequently*, the oner year limitation of 14-2-2 con-
tained therein is inapplicable. > . -^'<:,;-*. 
Rader vs. Manufacturer's Casualty Insurance Com-
pany, 242 F.2d 419 is a similar case, wherein the one 
giving a* bond required by statute to be furnished to 
the"United States, in turn became indemnified by a 
bond given by the defendant bonding company and by 
agreements executed by individuals. The court held 
that the second indemnification was a collateral 
matter and that the statute did not apply. The court 
said in diseussing^the second bond^-ajKl indemnification 
(11) 
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agreements: 
"None of these were required to be exe-
ecuted by any law of the United States in con-
nection with the giving of a surety bail bond. 
The various agreements under attack are collat-
eral arrangements of the surety and indemnitors 
and were executed to afford protection to the 
defendant surety company and its agents, and 
did not inure to the benefit of the United 
States." 
As in the Rader case, Western's bond was not given 
by the one required by statute to obtain it and it di*d .. 
not run to the one the statute required that it should. 
It was a collateral arrangement of the prime contractor 
to indemnify itself against loss for which it, in turn, 
had indemnified the United States. 
The fact that the obligee of the bond was not the 
obligee required by a statute was held in United States 
of America For the Use of General Accident Fire and Life 
Assurance Corporation, Ltd,, vs. Maguire Homes, Inc., and 
American Surety Company of New York, 186 F.Supp. 659, 
660 to make the statute inapplicable. The court there 
held that the federal court had no jurisdiction over a 
claim on a bond in which the United States is not the 
obligee. The court said: 
"The first of these bonds named Maguire 
Homes of Boston, Inc., and National Homes Accept-
ance Corporation as obligees; and the second 
named Maguire Homes of Providence, Inc., and 
National Homes Realty Corporation as obligees. 
(12) 
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-•----. There was no law of the United States re-
quiring that any such bonds should be exe-
cuted. Surely neither the Miller Act, 40 *• .i 
USCA 270(a), nor the Capehart Act, 42 USCA 
1594 applied, for those statutes contemplate 
.. bonds in which the United States is the ob-
ligee. Not being bonds executed under any 
law of the United States, this Court lacks., •; 
jurisdiction under 28 USC 1352. Rader vs. 
Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Company, 
2d Cir. , 242 F.2d 419> * 
The trial court reasoned that the Miller Act was 
inapplicable because the bond referred to therein was, 
. ,not the type of bond required by the act. It illogically 
n failed to apply the same reasoning when considering .; 
T-4,: whether or not the bond requiring an owner improving 
^ its land to furnish a bond is applicable to a situation 
in which a bond is furnished by someone else. 
3 An early case in which Sthis court construed the 
act which preceeded the existing Private Contracts bond-
ing act 14-2-1 et seq. is Liberty Coal and Lumber Com-
pany vs. Snow, 53 U.298, 178 P. 341. This court was 
:..*. determining who was required under the-act to furnish 
a bond. In cqnsidering the language of the predecessor 
act, it concluded that an owner of land who had his 
father build a home thereon with the agreement that the 
father could live therein 'for- a period^of time was an 
"owner" and as such had a duty to require his father 
to furnish a bond. The opinion makes clear that the" 
(13) 
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bond the act relates to is that required by the owner. 
The court said: , i
 ; 
"The statute does not concern itself 
with the legal relationship of the parties; 
that is, it is quite immaterial whether the 
agreement to construct a building upon land 
is made between the owner thereof and the 
contractor, or between the owner and the 
builder, or between him and his tenant, or 
between him and any other person; but if 
the owner of the land contracts for the con-
struction of a building on his land, the 
statute makes it his duty to comply with its 
terms if he desires to escape personal lia-
bility. The purpose of the statute is to 
prevent the owners of land from having 
their lands improved with the materials and 
labor furnished and performed by third per-
sons, and thus to enhance the value of such 
lands, without becoming personally responsi-
ble for the reasonable value of the materials 
and labor which enhances the value of those 
lands." 
The limitation provision relating to the act cannot 
apply unless the act itself applies. In no way can the 
contractor Tolman be considered to have been an "owner" 
and thus one required by the act to furnish the bond. 
The Private Contracts bond act is not designed to place 
an obligation* upon the contractor to require a bond from 
its subcontractor, nor to impose liability upon the con-
tractor for failure to obtain such a bond. "^ 
A further illustration of the fact that the Pri-
vate Contracts bond act should not be applied is the 
• fact that the particular wording of 14-2-1 does not 
(14) 
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require the owner to furnish a bond in all instances 
in which work is done. For instance, in King Brothers, 
Inc., r vs. Utah Dry Kiln Company, 13\U.2d:339;, 374 P.2d .,: 
254, this court was looking carefully at whether qr not 
the work"; was such as that referred to in 14-2-1 as' being 
included within "construction of building, structure, 
or improvements1' 'and remanded, the case to the trial 
court to determine whether or not a furnace for drying 
lumber was such an improvement. Here liability or 
lack thereof should notbe^determined upon the basis •>-:-*'; 
of any such refinement set forth in the language of 
.14-2-1. In other words, liability here f^ r excava-
tion work should not be dependent upon whether or not 
excavation is the type of w©fk included within f,con>/ 
struction of building,/structure or improvement." 
,A further reason*that 14-2-2 UCA is inapplicable 
is that Arnold is suing upon &• .bond that was furnished. 
The limitation in 14-2-2 is by its terms applicable to 
liability for failure to furnish a bond. The pertinent 
language is as follows: 
"Any person subject to the provisions 
of this chapter, who shall fail to obtain 
such good and sufficient bond*.... shall be -. - ---
personally liable... Actions to recover on 
such liability shall be commenced within 
one year..." 
J - • » . : " ' - ' • • • - • - - -, s~?' 
(15) 
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The trial court seemed to feel that because a 
erne year limitation period was expressly provided 
for in various situations involving construction 
work, that there should be a one year limitation in 
every such situation, and that it would be logical 
that such should follow. If, indeed, it would be 
more logical to have a one year limitation apply in 
every suchsituation, that is a legislative, not a 
judicial function. 
Statutes of limitation, being in derogation of 
rights existing at comihon law, w&re originally strict-
ly construed. Although, now they are often liberally 
construed, they should not be applied to situations 
not contemplated by 'the legislature;- It1has been said 
in discussing applicability of a statute of limitations: 
"•..such statute applies only to the parti-
cular actions which it recites, and no others, 
u\--.i and the courts cannot, uhdfer the guise of con-
struction, apply a statute of limitations to 
cases not within the statutory provisions.ff 
51 Am. Jur.2d, Limitation of Actions, par. 61. 
It is therefore apparent that for the following 
reasons, 14-2-2 is inapplicable" 
1. The owner of land did not require the bond. 
2. The contractor with the owner did not fur-
nish the bdiid* ^.IiBna v.Tiiij.^ .rl .t:..^.-
3. The bond did not run to the owner. 
(16) 
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.4. The limitation applies to an action for :^  
failure to obtain a bond, rather than to 
an action on the bond. 
No one year limitation being applicable to this 
action, we conclude that the six year limitation for 
claims under written instruments, set forth in 78-12-
23, is the applicable statute of 1imitations,' and that 
this action is not barred. 
-; Real Party In Interest 
Western, in its answer, set forth the defense 
that Arnold was not a third party beneficiary and/ - .* 
therefore,, could not sue on the bond. ~ ~ "l' 
The pleadings,'; answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file show that the parties who know 
the facts concerning the use of the equipment, who 
are plaintiff, who owned it, and defendant Prince, _ 
who rented it, state that it was used by Prince on 
the job for which WesCernfiirniferhed the bond» There 
is no genuine issue af fact in relation thereto. 
- This court, long ago, concluded that leased equip-
ment is considered as being "material" used on a job, 
and rentals therefor are covered by a labor and ma-
terials bond. J. P. To1ton Investment Company vs. " 
(17) 
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Maryland Casualty Company, 77 U. 226, 293 P. 611, 615. 
Rule 17(a) URCP provides in part "every action 
shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in 
interest." Plaintiff, as third party beneficiary, is 
the real party in interest, and as such, is a proper 
party plaintiff. 
T,The general rule which permits a third per-
son for whose benefit a contract is made to 
enforce the contract enables a person not 
named in the bond, but for whose benefit the 
bond was given, to bring an action to enforce, 
rights under the bond." 12 Am. Jur.2d, Bonds, 
Par. 39. 
"Contractor's bonds. Under the principle that 
the person for whose benefit a contract is made 
with another may maintain an action on such con-
tract...a public bond, required by statute of 
contractors, conditioned for the protection of 
those who furnish labor or materials for con-
struction of public works contracted for, can 
be enforced by any person to whom the principal 
is indebted for work or material under the con-
tract secured by the bond..."11 C.J.S., Bonds, 
Par. 106. 
"Who may sue; parties. As a general rule where 
the bond of a contractor for a state improvement 
is for the benefit of persons supplying labor or 
material, such persons.may sue on the bond, al-
though the state is the only one named as obligee 
and there is no express provision giving third 
persons rights thereunder, and notwithstanding 
the absence of privity of contract between the 
principal contractor and such persons." 81 C. J. S 
States, Par. 119. 
Some authorities have even gone so far as to hold 
that the named obligee cannot sue. 17 Am. Jur.2d., 
Contractor's Bonds, Par. 125. 
(18) Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In Deluxe Glass Company vs.. Martin, et al., 116 U. 
144, 208 P. 2d 1127, 11.31, this court, in considering a -
bond, which one of the parties contended was not a statu-
tory bond, held that, assuming that it was not a statutory 
bond and was a common lav obligation, "the weight of 
authority is to the effect that under the bond here in-
volved...the plaintiff (who was a materialman) may sue 
the surety. " '"*•••**. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no genuine issue of fact on any of the 
following: $11,415.74 is the amount of unpaid rental 
due from Prince to Arnold, together with interest from 
November 12, 1975, the date of such adjudication. The 
equipment rented was used by Prince on the Fish Lake 
job. Western guaranteed that Prince would pay material-
men. Arnold is a materialman and is unpaid. The 
action is not barred by a one year statute of limitation. 
Arnold, as a third party beneficiary, is entitled to 
summary judgment against the bonding company Western. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Brayton, Lowe § Hurley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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